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LAW, ECONOMICS, AND TORTURE 
~ 
James Boyd White 
It is common to observe that in the past decade or so there has been a massive trans-
fer of wealth from ordinary people and the poor to the rich. But it is plain that 
there has been very little effective resistance to this transfer by the majority who are 
disadvantaged by it and who presumably constitute the ultimate power in a democ-
racy. Why is this so? 
This is the first question James Boyd White addresses in this essay. 
The second question, seemingly unrelated, has to do with a deep change in the 
understanding of law and its practice, both in the courts, where judicial opinions 
now tend to be written in a dead and mechanical way, and in law schools, where 
there seems to be little interest in or excitement about what lawyers and judges ac-
tually do and, instead, a focus on questions of policy. Why has this change occurred 
and what does it mean? 
The third question in a sense bridges the other two: why is it that there has been 
so little public outrage and outcry at the efforts by the administration to make the tor-
ture of suspects or captives a normal and legalized part of our government} business.? 
In this essay White's aim is to suggest at least preliminary answers to these 
questions, and to a fourth as well- What are we to do about the situation in which 
we find ourselves.? 
In our invitation to them as speakers at this conference Jeff and I encour-
aged the contributors to this volume to talk in whatever way seemed best 
to them, whether or not it happened to comport with usual academic 
styles of thought or expression. I here take advantage of our own invita-
tion and talk a little differently from the way I usually do, about what I take 
our culture of politics and law to be like at the moment. What I say will 
necessarily be impressionistic and personal, and of course I do not ask you 
to accept any of it on my say-so. 
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Take these reflections, rather, as a question, which is how far your own 
experience, or your own thinking, is like or unlike my own. Perhaps I may 
say that, in the terms suggested by Cathleen Kaveny, I am speaking in 
something of a prophetic voice, not a casuistical one, and it is a fair ques-
tion for you to ask whether this is justified and, if so, how. 
As I think about the way things are changing under our feet, a series of 
phenomena come to my mind. Maybe they are connected, maybe not. 
That is one of my questions. 
MAKING THE RICH RICHER 
The first of these is the response-or more properly nonresponse-of the 
public and the media to the remarkable transfer of national wealth to the 
very rich that has taken place in our lives. I grew up under Eisenhower, 
when there was a 90 percent tax on incomes over one hundred thousand 
dollars (a million dollars in our terms) and a general sense that our country 
was committed to fundamental equality. This was perhaps in part the re-
sult of World War II, of which people at ,every economic level bore the 
cost, even unto death. It was clear to almost everyone that we were some-
how all in this together. The sense of solidarity I mean was expressed both 
in Truman's desegregation of the military and in his proposed civil rights 
bill, and perhaps it underlies Brown v. Board of Education as well. 
The transfer of wealth to a class of super-rich began modestly under 
Kennedy and has taken off in the past decade. It has been I think a delib-
erate goal of the Bush administration, but its roots are much deeper in our 
world than that. What concerns me is that in recent years, aside from a few 
harmless op-ed pieces, and a few more substantial articles in progressive 
journals, there has been little real concern about this transfer of wealth-
certainly not the mass outrage one might have expected. I include law 
school faculties and students among those unconcerned. 
The Consumer Dream and the Ideology of the Market ~ 
My question is this: why has this transfer not been instantly and unani-
mously resisted by the enormous majority of people at whose expense the 
rich are multiplying their wealth-a majority most of whom are not doing 
well economically, some of whom are doing very badly? 
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This is a matter of mass psychology, and of course I am no expert, but 
I sense here a feeling of helplessness in the face of overwhelming force. I 
think that the concentration of wealth is not in the eyes of most people a 
good thing; they feel rather that nothing can be done about it and that, in 
a world like this, one had better simply look to his or her own welfare, not 
large questions of law and democracy. 
The rules of the game have somehow shifted over the past twenty 
years or so: it seems that one is not to expect equality, or fairness, or com-
passion, from our society or its government; one is not to expect decent so-
cial and medical services, or clean air, or a mature response to the immense 
problems of global warming; one is not to expect lawyers and judges to talk 
in an earnest and serious way about what justice requires. These things are 
not going to happen, so don't waste your energy complaining. It is a kind of 
learned helplessness. 
Obviously I cannot wholly explain this shift, but one factor seems to 
me to lie in the way we have come to talk about the nature and purpose of 
our country, and of human life itself, which is largely in economic terms. 
For the society as a whole the dominant motive is assumed to be the pow-
erful but empty desire for wealth, without regard to what good or evil that 
wealth might do; for the individual, felicity is defined largely in terms of 
ownership and consumption. The ''American Dream" is no longer a dream 
of escape from totalitarian rule and lawless government, as it once was, but 
a dream of expansive, seemingly unlimited, getting what you want. Of 
course this way of talking has no place for democratic government-for 
that requires action, judgment, responsibility, not mere consumption. 
This way of imagining life is not only an empty and trivializing image 
of human experience; it hides the crucial truth that what the consuming 
economy in fact creates is not just more opportunity for consumption but 
power, power in the form of wealth. And great wealth gives great power. As 
the government withdraws from the regulation of the economy, which it 
has been doing for decades now, its place is taken by private individuals or 
private organizations which have immense power over the lives of all of us. 
The rhetoric supporting this movement speaks of government as the 
enemy, and of the market as freedom for us all. But the power that is cre-
ated by the disparity of wealth is real power, and unlike governmental 
power, it is for the most part not shaped or guided by law and democracy. 
The owners and managers are not elected by the people, not subject to the 
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Constitution, not supposed-or sometimes even allowed-to be moti-
vated by any ideal other than the acquisition of wealth and power, and usu-
ally not responsive to argument or complaint.1 
This arrangement is implicitly-and sometimes explicitly-defended 
by the argument that this power actually is subject to the control of the 
people, not through government, but through what is called the discipline of 
the market, which, the argument runs, is both more efficient and fairer than 
regulation through law. But the market cannot be a substitute for demo-
cratic government: it has no place or role for any of the institutions through 
which government works, or for the kind of public deliberation, thought, 
and argument by which those institutions live; it works not by the principle 
of "one person, one vote" but by the very different principle of "one dollar, 
one vote"; and it simultaneously generates and obscures immense imbal-
ances in wealth and power. The market contains no check on the drive to 
unlimited economic expansion, a drive that is proving to be suicidal, threat-
ening the living planet upon which everything we are and do depends. 
Those who argue for "getting the government off our backs" are really 
arguing for the transfer of power from a democratically responsible gov-
ernment to a regime without any democratic legitimacy at all, indeed with-
out any governing rationality. 
The consumer dream of our culture teaches us that we have no re-
sponsibility, no capacity for action, no right to demand meaning in our 
work and lives, and no obligation for the welfare of others. It induces the 
sense of learned helplessness I referred to earlier-which is exactly the op-
posite of the kind of vigorous independence and competence upon which 
democracy depends. 
Advertising and Propaganda ed-
One particularly strong feature of the culture of consumption is an im-
mense and relentless campaign, so pervasive and so normalized as to have 
become invisible, to persuade the public to accept and act on its premises. 
I refer here to the world of consumer advertising, especially to its apothe-
osis in television. This kind of advertising persuades people not only to buy 
this or that item but more importantly, to accept and live by the whole in-
fantile dream of the consumer economy. It is only in a narrow sense that 
advertisements compete with each other; in a deeper way they reinforce 
one another constantly.2 
Even more disturbingly, this kind of advertising has a direct analogue 
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in the way in which national politics proceeds, for it has become accepted 
that a political campaign is run like an advertising campaign- though a 
better word for this cultural form, given its connection with state power, 
would be propaganda. 
Both propaganda and advertising are marked by the desire to manipulate 
others through the use of slogans and cliches and images, sound bites and 
buzzwords. As they become widespread-active and present in our minds 
and speech-both forms of speech tend to destroy in us the capacity for in-
dependent thought and expression upon which self-government depends. 
One characteristic of both forms is that nothing is meant, everything 
is said for the moment, all on the assumption that the people who make up 
the audience have no memory, no capacity for critical thought. We are in-
vited to join a world where thought is not possible.3 In neither domain-
the consumer economy or the world of politics and government-are we 
defined as responsible participants in a world of shared life and action. 
Rather, we are manipulated objects of an empire. 
The Fact of Empire td 
So here is my rather glum conclusion: My intuition is that the reason we do 
not rebel at the immense and unfair transfer of wealth, and all that is asso-
ciated with it-from golden parachutes for failed CEOs to sixty-millon-
dollar bonuses for successful investment bankers-is that in some sense we 
do not believe that we really have democracy at all any more, at least in the 
sense in which we once thought we did. 4 Democracy and its law are based 
on a vision of fundamental equality among human beings, and neither can 
survive in a world in which equality is systematically denied by such dispar-
ities of wealth and power. Under these conditions the best we can have is a 
series of contests among the powerful resolved by plebiscites. 
I believe we· have become to a large degree the subjects of an oligarchy, 
an internal empire. By empire here I do not mean just the cultural forces, 
strong as they are, that make up what Simone Weil calls an "empire of 
force,"but an actual political reality in which unelected people rule much of 
our lives. Their object is to extract as much economic value as possible 
from the earth and the oceans and the air, and from the labor-and unem-
ployment-of billions of people. 
This empire has co-opted many of us-perhaps all of us-who might 
be its critics, because we to a large degree benefit, though in a relatively 
small way, by the same policies that enrich the super-rich. We eat at ex-
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pensive restaurants, and take trips to Europe, and buy expensive suits. So 
do the reporters for the Washington Post and the New York Times. There is 
in our world almost no voice for the poor, which is perhaps a third of our 
nation. The New York Times does of course take positions of concern for 
the poor on its editorial pages. But its ''Arts," "Style," "Escapes;' and 
"Travel" sections, and the advertising in its Sunday magazine, all with one 
voice affirm the value of wealth and consumption and the world of radical 
inequality they create. 
Democracy at Work id 
Having painted this distressing picture, I want to affirm that in my experi-
ence there is a remarkable force of another and opposed kind in American 
life-not much seen in the media or in the world of national politics-
which I would call a natural readiness for self-government. We see it in lo-
cal politics all the time, in elections for the school board, say, and in home-
owner associations and other private groups. This is the world where we 
know how to create an organization -with president, vice president, trea-
surer, secretary-which is subject to bylaws and a statement of purpose, 
and whose meetings follow Robert's Rules of Order. We know how to live in 
the space it defines: how to hold meetings and reach decisions and live 
with them even when we disagree; how to define our common values and 
purposes and try to live by them. 
But this capacity for self-government-perhaps our greatest national 
treasure-is simply not much visible either in the ways I see the nation de-
scribed in the media or in the ways politicians and officials talk about it or 
in the way I see the national government functioning. Congress, for exam-
ple, does not seem to work as I describe the school board working, in a real 
way, with real debates and real decisions: all too often it seems to be only an 
image or phantasm of itself, a pretense of government, in which almost 
nothing is ever said that anyone m~ans. What one hears is almost always 
calculated and shaped, as a piece of advertising is shaped, by asking what 
will work with the audience one is simultaneously flattering and manipu-
lating. This is sometimes even true of judicial opinions. 
THE ABANDONMENT OF LAW 
My second phenomenon-perhaps you perceive it too-is the experience 
of reading certain Supreme Court opinions which seem evidently written 
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by clerks and not much rewritten by the justices.5 These opinions seem to 
speak in no one's voice, without seriousness, without a sense of responsi-
bility for what is done or said, as though deciding the case and explaining 
the decision were empty exercises. 
The Courts and the Law Schools ,d 
Such opinions do not seem to me in any way to reflect, as I was taught an 
opinion should, a deep struggle to determine the meaning of the relevant 
legal authorities-and in the process to find one's own mind growing and 
learning-but rather express a largely unexamined judgment one way or 
the other as to the result of the case, often based on rather crude previous 
commitments of a political kind, which are not tested in the crucible of 
thought and argument. 6 This kind of formulaic jurisprudence does not ex-
pose the true reasons and thinking of the Court, and subject it to criti-
cism; and it does not produce texts that can be read with the kind of care 
and attention we are used to giving texts in the law. 
For a comparison, let me suggest you look through a volume of 
Supreme Court reports from forty or fifty years ago. The difference is 
striking: here we have distinctive voices, distinctive minds working seri-
ously, responding to each other, trying to say the truth as they see it. Of 
course they are subject to frailty, as we all are, but at their best they are en-
gaged in a process of self-education, and the education of the public as well. 
Just to list the names is to invoke a different world. (In 1962, for example, 
when I was in law school, the justices were Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Clark, Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, and White. These are re-
spectable people by any measure.) 
I also see a turning away from the law in law schools themselves, which 
have in some ways become closer to "think tanks" or public policy insti-
tutes than the schools of professional training I once knew. In casebooks 
the cases are often reduced to paradigms meant to facilitate argument 
about theory, rather than seen, as they occur in practice, as complex chal-
lenges to the mind, in which law interacts with facts, facts with law, differ-
ent laws with different laws, and all these things with our developing sense 
of justice. Rather, the main interest seems to be in questions of policy and 
theory abstracted from the life of the lawyer or judge. 
I was taught that the central legal questions, for lawyer and judge alike, 
are these: What texts should count as authoritative, and why? What do 
they mean, and why? What weight should be given to the judgment a text 
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reflects, and why? How in the light of all these things, and in the context of 
the present, should the case be decided? Of course lawyers will disagree on 
the merits of all these questions, but they will agree in affirming a world in 
which power is distributed, regulated, reviewed. 
The tendency I mean is manifest perhaps particularly in what is called 
"law and economics," but not only there. It runs through the ways in which 
scholarship is evaluated and it shows up in our almost total silence about 
law teaching. When I went into law teaching it was with great doubt about 
whether I would ever write anything, but with great confidence that the 
teaching of law was itself an activity-an art with a meaning-that could 
occupy a mind and justify a life. I wonder if anyone thinks that today. 
A system of policy critique of the kind that is at work in our law 
schools may make useful discoveries, but such a system cannot perform the 
functions of law itself Neither economics nor sociology nor psychology 
nor any other field can address, let alone resolve, the distinctive legal ques-
tions about the identity and meaning of authoritative texts and about the 
degree of deference due the judgments of others. 7 Taking economics as my 
example-though the same point could be made about any other field-I 
would say: One cannot do law in the language of economics, or economics 
in the language of the law. To try to do either would be as ludicrous as try-
ing to do science in the language of religion, or religion in the language of 
science.8 
Cost-Benefit Analysis ~ 
My sense of what has been happening is well exemplified in two brief pas-
sages by Judge Richard A. Posner. In the first, discussed in another context 
by Jed Rubenfeld, Posner is writing in favor of what he calls "pragmatism," 
meaning the decision of legal cases by a judicial balancing of costs and 
benefits. The only reason for attending to prior legal texts, in his view, is 
that to disregard them would have social costs, and these costs should be 
taken into account by the person with power. 
The point is not that the judge has some kind of moral or even polit-
ical duty to abide by constitutional or statutory text, or by precedent; 
that would be formalism. It is merely that continuity and restraint in 
the judicial function are important social goods, and any judge 
proposing to innovate must consider not only the benefits of the in-
novation but also the costs in injury to those goods.9 
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To me this misunderstands the nature of both law and democracy, includ-
ing the obligation -moral, political, and legal-to respect the authority of 
legal texts and the fundamental principle of separation of powers. In the 
world called into being by this passage law would lose its essential meaning. 
More recently, in a letter to the New York Review of Books, responding 
to a critical review by Professor David Cole of his book Not A Suicide Pact, 
Judge Posner said that Cole must realize that his civil libertarian principles 
"are not the product of 'text, tradition, and reason' since equally capable le-
gal thinkers hold opposite views." Posner continues: 
This is possible because there is no consensus on what methodology 
to use to resolve constitutional disputes and because text, tradition, 
precedent, and reason so often tug in different directions. ... Realism 
requires recognition that constitutional decision-making at the high-
est level (The US Supreme Court) in the most difficult cases is driven 
in the main by policy judgments based usually on just the kind of bal-
ancing that Cole deplores. Or pretends to deplore; for I imagine au 
fond the reason he dislikes the administration's counterterrorism 
measures is that he thinks they impose greater costs, in harm to civil 
liberties, than the benefits they confer in reducing the risk of further 
terrorist attacks. The rest is rhetoric.10 
This passage adds to the misunderstanding expressed in the first. Together 
they represent with great clarity the state of affairs I am trying to define. 
Of course the meaning of the authoritative texts of the law is often highly 
arguable in a range of cases. But that does not mean that we can dismiss 
them as useless, or that in the zone of disagreement we are free to apply 
whatever version of cost-benefit analysis, or other method or theory, hap-
pens to appeal to us. What Posner contemptuously dismisses as "rhetoric" 
is nothing less than the entire world of law: its structure of authority, its 
democratic basis, its creation of a constituted government based upon sep-
aration of powers. In its place he proposes a view that all that matters is 
power, a view in which not only is there no need to respect the opinion of 
another, there is no way in which this can be done. 
Indeed there is something deeply incoherent in Posner's view, for how 
is the question to be answered, Whose calculation of costs and benefits is 
to count? Apparently the judge's; but the position that the judge occupies, 
and upon which Posner relies, does not reflect some present judgment of 
costs and benefits, but rests upon law in the sense in which I have been de-
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scribing it: the democratic allocation of function to decide, within limits 
and subject to guidance and review. To say that some judgment of better 
and worse lies behind this legal structure-including the obligation to re-
spect the judgments of others and to engage in good-faith legal debate 
when, as often, the meaning of the texts is arguable-is to say nothing at 
all. 
What Law Can Be td 
I have a sense, then, that law itself is being eroded and transformed, just as 
I said earlier democracy is being eroded and transformed, and in both cases 
in the service of what I have called the empire. This fact has a tragic qual-
ity for me because the law by its nature should be a strong force of resis-
tance to the principles of empire, a strong force of defense for democracy. 
For the law is built at its foundations upon the principle of separation 
of powers, not their merger into a single force. In this, it is the opposite of 
empire. In our law every institutional actor must acknowledge and respect 
judgments made by others: the legislature must respect the judgments ex-
pressed in the constitution, the courts the judgments of the legislature, 
lower courts the judgment of higher courts, and so on. This means that the 
lawyer never addresses a person who has all the power. Both lawyer and 
judge constantly turn to other texts, composed by other persons, who have 
made judgments on the questions in the case which they are bound to re-
spect. 
It is crucial that the texts that our law invokes as authoritative, and to 
which the judges and lawyers pay respect or deference, all rest in some way 
upon the authority of democratic institutions. They are statutes passed by 
elected legislatures, or opinions issued by judges appointed by elected gov-
ernors, or contracts written by the parties themselves, and so on. In affirm-
ing the value and validity of its own processes the law is thus always affirm-
ing democracy:11 
The law is not a closed system, operating behind locked doors, but is 
connected in hundreds of ways to our democratic culture. To disregard this 
structure of authority and to replace it with a theory-whether philo-
sophical, political, or economic in kind-is to erode our democracy at the 
root. For in the world of theory the rightness of the result depends upon 
its congruence with the theory in question, necessarily a theory without 
any basis in democratic authority but resting solely upon the commit-
ments of those who are persuaded by it: the community of believers. 
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At the simplest level, what the law teaches is that we live in a world in 
which different people can have different, decent, and reasonable views; 
that we need a way to respect these views and judge among them fairly, that 
is, openly and honestly; that the world constructed by the law is one that 
distributes the power to decide such questions differentially to various 
public and private agents-so that even if we lose this case, or this issue, we 
have a residue of autonomy and freedom; and that, all this being true, we 
cannot fairly and rightly decide disputes by reference to theory, or to our 
own estimate of costs and benefits, or to the sorts of cliches and buzz-
words and slogans that characterize much political talk. The law, at its best, 
improves our thought and our language. What has been happening to law, 
however, is that it is becoming an instrument of empire, and in the process 
losing its essential character. 
TORTURE 
My third phenomenon is the public response-or once more, the nonre-
sponse - to the recent efforts of the administration to legalize what any 
sensible person would call torture-certainly if he or she were subjected to 
it-and the related effort to remove from all protections of the law a class 
of human beings selected by officials as "enemy combatants." Of course, 
there are honorable exceptions in the bar and in the public world, but 
there has not been what there should have been, a universal public outcry 
of a sort that would have driven the beast of torture off the field of our 
shared life. 
This has haunted me more than anything else. Not so much because 
American soldiers have on occasion beaten, abused, tortured, and killed 
people they have captured. Those are terrible things, but war always in-
cludes them, just as it includes the incineration of little children, the rape 
of women, the purposive destruction of life itself What is new here are the 
efforts to make torture part of the approved business of government, 
claiming for it the authoriry of law, and to establish the existence of a class 
of persons under the control of the government who are completely be-
yond any protection of law. 
To connect this image with what I said about the state of legal think-
ing, I think we hear an all-too-familiar voice in the famous "torture mem-
orandum" composed by Jay Bybee, now a federal judge:12 it is written in me-
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chanical and conclusory terms, as though a routine legal analysis of a rather 
empty kind could simply be used without thought and without question to 
justify human torture. There is no sense of a person in the prose, no one 
making judgments for which he is responsible. It troubles me to think, as I 
do, that this is a voice for which we who teach in law schools may be espe-
cially responsible. 
The Propaganda of Torture ~ 
Part of the reason for our supine lack of response is our habituation to the 
sort of advertising and propaganda I have mentioned, for which the fears 
generated by the events of 9/11, and unceasingly stimulated since, provide 
strong nourishment. According to this thin and inadequate form of think-
ing, there is an ineradicable line between "us" -the good people of Amer-
ica under unjustified and aggressive threat-and "them," those others 
whose torture or "severe interrogation" is in question. Why should we care 
about what happens to them? They are the enemy, or at least irredeemably 
"other." 
But of course they are not these things in fact: they are fellow human 
beings, some of them citizens of our country. They are selected for torture 
or abuse not by some foolproof process that will identify without error the 
"bad," whoever they are, but by who knows whom, acting on who knows 
what information, and with who knows what motives, with all this hap-
pening behind a deliberate screen of secrecy. 
The central principle of democratic government is official responsibil-
ity, and here that is entirely erased. No one stands up as the one who has 
made the crucial decisions; n_o one in the public even knows that most of 
them have been made. 
The fate of Guantanamo prisoners who were returned to their own 
countries is instructive. Almost all of them were released after investiga-
tion by their home governments, it turning out that many of them had 
been seized without any justification at all by persons seeking a bounty of-
fered for the identification of "terrorists." Only a handful were tried in 
their home countries and at the time of this writing none of those had 
been convicted of any crime.13 
Even if someone is in fact an "enemy," that of course does not justify 
his torture. Maybe he has to be killed, if he is shooting at you, but when 
captured, he should be treated humanely and with dignity, as we hope our 
soldiers will be treated when they are captured. 
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The "Need for Information" rd 
It is sometimes argued that torture is justified by the need for "informa-
tion." This argument works by another specious form of thought, which, 
when added to the first, seeks to establish a sense of necessity that will re-
move torture from the moral sphere almost completely. The form of 
thought I mean is captured in this question, repeated endlessly in the me-
dia and even in classrooms: if you knew that there was an atom bomb 
somewhere downtown with a timer ticking wouldn't you torture the 
people who knew about it to make them tell you where it was, or how to 
disarm it? 
The question seems to pose a serious problem of moral thought, but, 
like many such hypotheticals, it is not real. You can never "know'' there is 
an atom bomb, or a timer ticking; and you can never "know'' that you have 
one of the "people who know about it." The facts assumed by the hypo-
thetical never exist in any individual case. And even if there were one such 
case that would do nothing to justify the hundreds or thousands or tens of 
thousands of cases in which we have engaged in torture. The question 
about the ticking bomb invites us to live in a false world-the world ulti-
mately of advertising and propaganda-not the real world. 
The unreal hypothetical is used not to support the proposition that it 
might possibly support, namely, that in a wildly rare and dramatic case one 
would use torture, but something very different, namely, that torture itself 
should be evaluated simply by weighing the costs and benefits of the prac-
tice. "You believe in torture in one case in a million," we are being told, 
"therefore you can have no objection to our regular use of torture as an in-
strument of policy, under whatever procedures and standards we choose." 
The logic of cost-benefit analysis is epitomized in the ticking-bomb 
case, but it runs far more widely and deeply in our culture than that hypo-
thetical. All of the practices of abuse and inhumanity rest upon the same 
claim, that "national security'' or the "safety of the nation" require it, an in-
vocation of "cost-benefit analysis" that typically reflects no analysis what-
ever. 
Irrationality rd 
Despite its claims to a high degree of rationality, the kind of cost-benefit 
analysis that is so often offered as an alternative to legal thought in fact 
tends not to the rational but to the irrational.14 It is a long-standing truism 
in the critique of "balancing," for example, that the outcome is often de-
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termined by the way in which the interests are articulated. Are we to define 
the question as the "safety of the nation" versus "this person's desire to 
keep this piece of information to himself"? Or as "the value of this piece of 
information"versus "our system of government under law''? The outcome-
shaping characterization is of course often driven by desire, perhaps un-
conscious desire, for a certain result. In this sense the designation of costs 
and benefits, seemingly so rational, is often in the end not that at all. 
And who is to quantify the danger that terrorism presents? The incan-
tation of the phrase "national security" is offered as a universal acid that will 
erase everything except the fear that it stimulates. This talk about over-
whelming necessity fails to address the obvious questions-obvious to a 
lawyer, that is: Who shall determine whether such a necessity exists? Under 
what procedures and standards? Subject to what review? These are the core 
questions of legal thought, and they are by this logic erased. For to take 
those questions seriously would be to invoke the whole apparatus of law as 
we know it. This cannot be allowed to happen, if one agrees that the im-
portance of national security-as defined bywhom?-is of infinite impor-
tance, because it would limit the power of the government to "protect us." 
It cannot be allowed for another reason, I think: namely, that torture 
cannot in the end be legalized. It cannot bear the light of day, but must go 
on behind locked doors in unmarked buildings, in mysterious and un-
known places reached by darkened airplanes, and carried out by anony-
mous interrogators and their anonymous assistants. The cost-benefit 
analysis must not include, because it cannot do so, the reality of the torture 
itself, the evil it does to the tortured and to the torturers alike. 
The corrosive effect of "cost-benefit analysis" here is even worse than 
I have said. The question presented by the ticking-bomb case is whether 
the "known" existence of the ticking bomb would justify torture. But of 
course such a bomb may in fact exist though unsuspected by us; if so, it 
presents exactly the same real-world danger as if it were known; does that 
not justify the use of what is euphemistically called "extreme measures" to 
find out? Indeed anyone may know something that is of comparable value, 
perhaps without even knowing how important it is. The true need for in-
formation is just as great in those cases as in the ticking-bomb case itself 
To think in terms of a single value that trumps all others, here "national 
security," is a form not of rationality but irrationality, ultimately a kind of 
insanity.15 
The logic at work here leads to universal spying, universal wiretapping, 
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universal torture, limited only by whatever costs are perceived by the perpe-
trator-or, more accurately, by the superior officer who in the comfort of his 
or her own office orders the perpetrator to torture. And this line of thinking 
not only justifies torture; it would justify anything. It erases not only protec-
tive legal rules, but the inherent protections of legal thought itself 
Once you start on a process of interest balancing in which one of the 
items is of potentially infinite value you have committed yourself to an im-
possible world of paranoia, not law-a world like the world of human slav-
ery-in which one value cancels all others, in which appetite, as Shake-
speare says, becomes a universal wolf and at last eats up itsel£16 
Democracy and Empire ,(:1-
The spring from which I think all these evils flow, including our incapacity 
to resist them, is the fact that at some level we know that we in this coun-
try are running an empire-an external one as well as the internal one I de-
scribed earlier. And we know, I think rightly, that it is not possible to run 
an empire on the assumptions and aspirations of democracy under law. 
The very idea and existence of the empire depends upon a line between 
"us" and "them" -we, the rulers who have the power, and they, including 
our own citizens, the ruled, who are subject to it. In the eyes of the empire 
the ordinary people of this country have no different status from foreign 
nationals: all are subject to the same imperial regime. Our nation is on its 
way to becoming a third-world country politically as well as economically. 
But the fact that we have become an imperial nation, internally and 
externally, is something no one can bear to admit, for it contradicts our 
deepest principles. It is I think at bottom our need to deny this fact that 
makes us so ready to submit ourselves and our judgments to slogans, 
cliches, and falsehoods-to live in the false world of advertising and pro-
paganda. 
This perception about empire, if I am right, connects my three 
themes: the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, the transfor-
mations in what we mean by law, and the acceptance of torture. The anti-
democratic principles necessary to the functioning of the empire with re-
spect to the outer world also become the principles by which it functions 
internally, and if these are inconsistent with law, we are implicitly told or 
shown, law itself must change its character. To try to be democratic at 
home and function as an empire abroad would make a mockery of the 
principles of equality and justice under law that are essential to what we 
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mean by democracy. An empire by its nature denies the fundamental prin-
ciple of human equality and requires dominance and subjugation, wher-
ever it reaches. 
Although this is not often said explicitly, I think that in both its forms 
the subjugating power of the empire is supported by the same implicit ar-
gument, namely, that the simple fact of immense power imbalance not 
only justifies empire but requires it. As a nation we are so powerful, the ar-
gument runs, that we are simply not subject to the constraints of law and 
justice; likewise the rich and the super-rich-individuals and corporations 
alike-are so powerful that we cannot imagine demanding fairness from 
them or insisting upon equality with them. In both cases the fact of gross 
disparity overwhelms the hope of equality by declaring it impossible. 
This is a modern version of a very old argument, seen (and rejected) in 
both Plato and Thucydides, namely, that justice is a proper topic of 
thought and argument only among equals. Where there is disparity of 
power those who have it will do what they want, the Athenians tell their 
victims in the famous Melian Dialogue; the rest must submit or die, and 
there is no point in pretending otherwise. The Athenians in this way seek 
to justify their refusal to recognize any constraint upon their power to kill 
and enslave all those who have rebelled against them. They claim to be be-
yond the reach of justice or its language. 
· I see in our own empire a similar claim-externally, on behalf of the 
nation with respect to other nations; internally, on behalf of the rich with 
respect to the people. The very fact of power of this scale and magnitude is 
implicitly said to make law and democracy impossible; and, as I have been 
arguing in this essay, we tend to believe the claim, without quite knowing 
that we do so. 
In this context what Thucydides himself shows and says is of real in-
terest. He demonstrates that the world of city-states in fifth-century 
Greece is regulated by a genuine international law, seen not as the com-
mand of some supranational sovereign but as the product of convention 
and agreement among the relevant states. He shows us how this system 
works in a real way, without any sovereign power; how it can be destroyed 
by a state (Athens) that has amassed so much power that it believes it can 
disregard the law and justice itself; and how this destruction leads eventu-
ally to the destruction of the superpower in question-which without law 
and justice cannot think rationally or sensibly about its own character, its 
own interest, even its own ambitions. 17 
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As Thucydides tells the story it is a true tragedy, for Athens has no real 
alternative. The international legal system of that day presumed the equal-
ity of the states, which the power of Athens itself destroyed. For us, how-
ever, there is a solution, for in the intervening centuries humanity has in-
vented the rule of law-equality under law, equality as an achievement of 
law. Instead of claiming immunity to law, the strong in our world should 
make every effort to affirm their allegiance to law, and to the fundamental 
equality that law and democracy together assert. To make the affirmation 
meaningful, they should accede to law especially where they have the eco-
nomic or military power to repudiate it. For it is ultimately upon law and 
justice-both among nations and within our nation-that our strength, 
our very identity, depends. 
This history teaches us that where there are immense imbalances of 
power the powerful should not reject with contempt the claims of law and 
justice, as the Athenians do, but quite the reverse. It is precisely at the 
point where one nation or group has the power to disregard such claims 
that it is most important, for the powerful themselves and for the rest of 
the world, that they cheerfully submit to them. In the end, it is not just the 
weak who need the rule of law and the claims of justice; all of us do. 
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